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Abstract
In many developing and developed countries, government debt stabilization is an important
policy issue. This paper models the strategic interaction between the monetary authorities who
control monetization and the fiscal authorities who control primary fiscal deficits. Government
debt dynamics are driven by the interest payments on outstanding debt and the part of the
primary fiscal deficits that is not monetized. Modelling the interaction as a differential game,
we compare the cooperative equilibrium and the non-cooperative Nash open-loop equilibrium.
The well-known unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is reinterpreted in this differential game
framework. We consider also the effects of making the Central Bank more independent.
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1. Introduction
During the 1980s, many developed and developing countries experienced substantial
increases in government indebtedness and problems in stabilizing government debt. Therefore,
government debt stabilization became a prominent issue in policy discussions. Recent interest
in the issue of government debt stabilization is related also to the debt target of 60% in the
Maastricht Treaty. Recently, the OECD (1994) surveyed the fiscal stance in its member
countries and expressed its concern regarding the development of public debt in several
countries. Projections of current fiscal policies show that in several countries debt stabilizes
only far beyond the year 2000 at levels that are some 30 percentage points of GDP higher
than current levels, which are already fairly high.
A conflict between fiscal and monetary authorities typically arises on whether fiscal
or monetary instruments should be adjusted to stabilize government debt. To formalize this
conflict, Tabellini (1986) has formulated a differential game between a fiscal and a monetary
authority. The current analysis extends Tabellini’s work by allowing the fiscal authority to
care also about monetary objectives and by introducing a specific debt target. Moreover, we
determine and interpret the various externalities the players impose on each other. We also
calculate the transitional and steady-state solutions for fiscal deficits, inflation and government
debt, providing new interpretations for these solutions as the outcome of the conflict between
monetary and fiscal authorities. Furthermore, the effects of changes in the objective functions
of monetary and fiscal authorities are derived. In particular, we consider the effects of making
monetary authorities more independent and we reinterpret the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic
of Sargent and Wallace (1981) as the outcome of strategic interaction between monetary and
fiscal policymakers.
Section 2 introduces the differential game between fiscal and monetary authorities. In
section 3 we provide the solutions for both the first-best cooperative equilibrium and the
second-best non-cooperative Nash open-loop equilibrium. Section 4 compares these two equi-
libria. The effects of changes in the preference functions of both players are discussed in
section 4. Section 5 provides a nume-rical example that illustrates the results found in the
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2. A differential game on government debt stabilization.
Primary fiscal deficits have to be financed either by base-money creation or by
accumulation of government debt. In many cases decisions on primary fiscal deficits are
delegated to the Treasury and management of monetary policy to a central bank. While
monetary and fiscal policies are delegated to different institutions, their policies are
interdependent because of the dynamic government budget constraint. The dynamic govern-
ment budget constraint namely shows the relation between primary fiscal deficits, f(t),
monetization or seignorage
3, m(t), interest payments on government debt, rd(t), and
government debt accumulation d ˙, where a dot above a variable refers to its time derivative:
d(t),f ( t ) and m(t) are expressed as fractions of GDP. r represents the rate of interest on
(1)
outstanding government debt minus the growth rate of output and is assumed to be exogenous
and therefore independent of the level of government indebtedness. (1) can be interpreted in
nominal as well as real terms, obtained if nominal variables are divided by P(t), the aggregate
price level.
If the fiscal deficit, f(t)+rd(t), exceeds the revenues from money creation of the
monetary authorities, m(t), government debt accumulation allows policymakers to shift the
adjustment burden associated with the fiscal deficit to the future. The dynamic government
budget constraint thus reveals that the interaction between the monetary and fiscal authorities
has both an intratemporal and an intertemporal dimension. The latter implies a link between
monetary and fiscal policies and the accumulation of government debt. The initial stock of
outstanding government debt d(0) and the (net of output growth) real interest rate play an
important role in the process of fiscal consolidation. With a large initial stock of debt and a
high interest rate on debt, government debt stabilization requires larger efforts than in a situa-
tion with a low initial stock of debt and low interest rates.
3 In Appendix A, we define m(t) in such a way that the inflation tax from unexpected
inflation on holders of government debt is also included in m(t). In practice, the inflation
tax on outstanding government debt is more important than the inflation tax on base
money. Appendix A shows how m(t) and the rate of inflation, p=P
˙
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Government solvency is ensured if we assume that the following transversality condi-
tion -generally referred to as the no-Ponzi game condition- is met:
Stabilization of government debt can be achieved in two alternative ways: by decreasing
(2)
primary fiscal deficits or by increasing base money creation. Policy conflicts arise if fiscal
and monetary policies are controlled by different institutions that assign different weights to
various objectives, including inflation, government debt stabilization, and public spending.
Following Tabellini (1986), we formalize the strategic interaction between monetary and fiscal
authorities by specifying instruments and objectives of the policymakers within a formal game
structure.
Consider the following intertemporal loss function of the fiscal authority, which
depends on the time profiles of the primary fiscal deficit, inflation, and government debt
4:
Fiscal authorities manage primary fiscal deficits to minimize the intertemporal loss function,
(3)
subject to the dynamic government budget constraint (1), the transversality condition (2), and
the initial stock of government debt, d(0). f, m and d represent exogenous policy targets for
inflation, the primary fiscal deficit and public debt. These "blisspoints" reflect the institutional
and political structures in which decisionmaking on macroeconomic policies takes place
5. The
subjective rate of time preference, d, determines how much policymakers discount future
losses
6.
As in Tabellini (1986), government debt features in the loss function because higher
4 Tabellini considers a special case with h=0 and d=0.
5 It is possible to interpret f ¯ as preferred government expenditures, given an exogenous
path for taxes, or alternatively, as preferred taxes given an exogenous path for government
expenditures. In the open economy, the monetary target can be interpreted also as an
exchange rate target.
6 A high rate of time preference is sometimes associated with a high degree of
political instability.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 5
levels of debt imply larger tax distortions in order to service the interest payments. Moreover,
the larger the stock of public debt, the larger the required adjustments in taxes associated with
fluctuations in the real rate of interest and real output. If Ricardian equivalence does not hold,
high levels of public debt are likely to also crowd out private investment and induce undesir-
able intergenerational redistributions of wealth.
Monetary authorities exhibit a similar loss function:
The preference parameters {h,l,k,m,f,d} are important determinants of the dynamics of the
(4)
fiscal deficit, the inflation rate and government debt. l and k determine how the adjustment
burden of government debt stabilization is distributed over the fiscal and monetary
policymakers in the form of, respectively, low primary fiscal deficits and a high level of
money creation. If k is high and l low, high money creation rather than small primary fiscal
deficits resolve the tension between the Treasury and the Central Bank on government debt
stabilization. Hence, this situation implies a strong fiscal player and a weak Central Bank. If
both k and l are small, neither player is willing to substantially adjust its policy in order to
stabilize government debt. Hence, the adjustment burden is shifted mainly towards the future
by accumulating even more public debt.
The difference between f+rd and m, which is assumed to be positive, is an important
determinant of government debt accumulation: it measures the gap between the desired
financing by the fiscal player, f+rd, and the desired accommodation by the monetary author-
ities, m. Accordingly, a larger difference between these two objectives intensifies the conflict
between the two authorities. Also a large initial stock of government debt, d(0), or a low debt
target intensify the conflict. In the remainder of the analysis, we assume that the initial stock
of debt exceeds the target, i.e. d(0)>d.
Another important factor is the difference between the rate of time preference, d, and
the net real interest rate, r.I fd > rand public debt does not directly feature in the objective
functions (i.e. l=k=0), the subjective benefits of additional government debt are lower than
its objective costs and policymakers would always prefer additional government debt so that
government debt would accumulate without bound.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 6
3. Solving the differential game.
Two elements are crucial in the dynamic interaction between monetary and fiscal
authorities: namely, first, whether policies are coordinated and, second, the information
structure. Coordination of macroeconomic policies internalizes the positive externalities on
the other player from efforts to stabilize government debt. The cooperative equilibrium is thus
Pareto efficient. Hence, we refer to the cooperative equilibrium as the Pareto equilibrium. This
equilibrium can serve as a benchmark to determine the inefficiency associated with non-
cooperative equilibria. In the case of the cooperative game, w and 1 are the weights attached
to the objectives of the fiscal and monetary authorities, respectively. The weights are the
outcome of an earlier bargaining process and are assumed to be given
7.
Regarding the information structure two aspects are crucial. First, we need to distin-
guish equilibria in which players can credibly commit to a sequence of future actions from
equilibria in which players cannot do so. With commitment, open-loop equilibria result. Lack
of commitment, in contrast, yields closed-loop equilibria. Open-loop strategies involve an
optimal time path of policy variables taking the policy actions of the other player as given.
Closed-loop strategies, in contrast, take into account the reaction of the other player at each
point in time. Second, non-cooperative equilibria in which one player acts as a leader have
to be distinguished from equilibria in which both player act simultaneously. When one player
assumes leadership, Stackelberg equilibria result, whereas Nash equilibria emerge without
leadership of one player.
Commitment problems arise in the current framework, because policies aimed at
reducing government debt are time-inconsistent: both players have an incentive to deviate
from commitments on debt stabilization. We do not solve the Nash-closed loop equilibrium
analytically because of complexity. The inability to commit typically aggravates inefficiencies
compared to the Nash open-loop equilibrium in the current framework, as shown in Tabellini
(1986). The complexity of closed-loop strategies requires the use of numerical techniques. In
order to compare analytical results, we focus here only on the differences between the first-
best cooperative equilibrium and the second-best Nash open-loop equilibrium, discarding the
7 It is possible to consider w to be the Nash-bargaining solution associated with the
coalition formation.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 7
Nash closed-loop and the Stackelberg open- and closed-loop equilibria.
The Pareto equilibrium is found by minimizing the following present-value Hamil-
tonian,
with respect to the available instruments {f(t),m(t)}. µ
P(t) is the co-state variable of the dy-
(5)
namic constraint (1). The first-order conditions of this dynamic optimization problem are:
The Nash open-loop equilibrium is found by separately maximizing the present-value
(6)
Hamiltonians of the fiscal and monetary authorities. The Hamiltonian of the fiscal authorities
is given by:
which gives rise to the following first-order conditions:
(7)
Maximization of the present-value Hamiltonian of the monetary authorities,
(8)
yields the following optimality conditions:
(9)
The optimization of quadratic objective functions produces linear dynamic systems of
(10)
government debt and the co-state variables associated with government debt, µ
i(t). TheseMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 8
dynamic systems {d(t),µ
i(t)} are replicated in appendix B. The dynamic systems are assumed
to display saddlepoint stability in order to rule out explosive government indebtedness and
thus violation of the transversality constraint (2)
8.
If initial government debt, d(0), exceeds steady-state government debt, d(¥), an in-
stantaneous upward jump in µ
i(0) induces a decrease of the primary fiscal deficit to f(0) and
an increase of money growth to m(0). Such changes in policies place the system on the
unique converging trajectory and take the system to its new steady-state equilibrium
{d(¥),µ
i(¥)}. The stable root of the dynamic system in {d(t),µ
i(t)} determines the transient
dynamics of the saddlepoint stable system: with a negative sign it measures the adjustment
speed towards steady- state. The adjustment speed is denoted by h.
The system dynamics can be written in the form:
where ¥ refers to the steady-state and 0 to the initial state of a variable. Expression (11) re-
(11)
veals that the dynamics of any variable can be characterized by three elements: the initial
state, the adjustment speed, h, and the steady-state solution. The next section derives these
three elements analytically for both the cooperative Pareto equilibrium and the non-
cooperative Nash open-loop equilibrium and compares both equilibria.
8 The dynamic systems exhibit saddlepoint stability as long as the number of negative
eigenvalues of the adjustment matrix equals the number of backward-looking variables and
the number of positive eigenvalues equals the number of forward-looking variables. The
state variable, d(t), is backward-looking. Hence, its initial value d(0) is given by history.
The co-state variables, µ
i(t), in contrast, are forward-looking variables: they jump if new
information arrives to ensure that d(t) is placed on the unique convergent path that is
consistent with the transversality condition (2).Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 9
4. A comparison of the cooperative and non-cooperative Nash open-loop equilibria.
The cooperative Pareto equilibrium and the non-cooperative Nash open-loop equilibria
can be solved analytically. Appendix B describes how one can obtain the initial value, the
adjustment speed and the steady-state of both equilibria. It is shown how the initial value, the
adjustment speed and the steady-state can be expressed in the following form:
Table 4.1 General formulation of solutions.
Table 4.1 implies that short-run and long-run inflation and primary fiscal deficit and
long-run debt can be expressed in terms of two elements: first, a parameter indicating the
intratemporal distribution of the adjustment burden associated with government debt stabiliza-
tion, a
9, and, second, a parameter indicating the intertemporal distribution of that burden, b,
9 a and (1-a) are closely related to the "feedback"-coefficients q1 and p1 used by
Tabellini. These coefficients measure by how much the monetary and fiscal authorities
adjust their policies to changes in the current stock of debt. Since the game is linear-
quadratic, Tabellini proposes the following feedback relations: m(t)=q0+q1d(t) and f(t)=p0-
p1d(t). Table 4.1 and (11) together imply: q0=m(0)-(1-a)(h+r)d(0), q1=-a(h+r), p0=f(0)+a-Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 10
which is inversely related to the adjustment speed, h. Both the cooperative and the non-
cooperative games yield the same expressions for initial and steady-state inflation, primary
fiscal deficits and steady-state debt in terms of a and D. D and a differ in the Pareto and
Nash open-loop equilibrium as follows:
Table 4.2 D and a in both equilibria.
Pareto Nash open-loop
The parameter a indicates how the intratemporal adjustment burden is distributed over
the two authorities. A large a indicates relatively weak fiscal authorities who bear most of
the adjustment burden. In particular, the primary fiscal deficit, f(t), is much below its bliss
point, f, while money growth is relatively close to its target value, m. If the fiscal authorities
are strong and the Central Bank is weak (i.e. a is small), in contrast, debt stabilization is
achieved mainly through monetization of fiscal deficits.
The parameter b reveals how the adjustment burden is shifted intertemporally. This
parameter is zero if authorities are patient (i.e. d=r). This indicates that the conflict between
fiscal and monetary policies is resolved without shifting the adjustment burden over time.
However, adjustment is largely shifted to the future if b is large, which occurs if policyma-
kers are impatient (i.e. d>r) and attach a low weight to debt stabilization. In that case the
adjustment speed, h,i sl o w
10. The impact of b on short-run and long-run policy variables
(h+r)d(0) and p1=(1-a)(h+r).
10 If weights attached to debt stabilization are low, D is small, according to Table 4.2.
According to Table 4.1, this implies that h is small as well.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 11
reflects the intertemporal distribution of the adjustment burden. A higher value of b implies
higher deficits and lower money growth in the short run, but lower deficits and higher money
growth in the long run
11. In other words the short run features underadjustment, causing
government debt to accumulate. The associated interest payments on government debt require
overadjustment in the long run.
Saddlepoint stability requires D
P and D
O to be positive. The expressions in Table 4.2
reveal that positive values for D require that policymakers attach a sufficiently high priority
to government debt stabilization (i.e. high values of l and k) as long as d exceeds r. Intu-
itively, in order to avoid explosive debt dynamics, authorities need to attach a sufficiently
high priority to debt stabilization in order to offset their impatience. Adjustment is slow if the
dynamic system is close to being unstable, i.e. the value of D is small. In particular, debt sta-
bilization is a time-consuming process if authorities are impatient (i.e. d exceeds r by a large
margin) and at the same time care little about debt stabilization (i.e. l and k are small).
The expressions for a show that the intratemporal share of the adjustment burden that
falls on the fiscal authorities is inversely related to w in the Pareto case. At the same time,
a higher weight of inflation in the objective function of the fiscal authorities increases a.I n
the Nash open-loop case, a depends only on the relative weights attached to debt stabilization
by the monetary and fiscal authorities. In particular, if the monetary authorities value debt
stabilization more than the fiscal authorities do (i.e. when k/l is large), they bear most of the
adjustment burden associated with the conflict between monetary and fiscal policies.
A comparison of the Pareto and Nash open-loop equilibria leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 4.1:
The speed of adjustment is higher and steady-state debt lower in the cooperative equilibrium,
if either (a) fiscal authorities attach less weight to inflation stabilization relative to debt sta-
bilization than the monetary authorities do, i.e. if l/h>k, or (b) fiscal authorities have limited
bargaining power, w, in the cooperative case.
11 Note that we assume that f+rd-m>0 and d(0)>d.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 12
Proof :





O . If we insert the definitions of D
P and D
O from Table 4.2 the inequality be-
comes:
The inequality (l-hk)>0 is a sufficient condition for the second inequality (12) to hold. If,
(12)
w¯0 the second term on the LHS of the second inequality (12) dominates the first term.
Hence, the inequality also holds. According to the definition of b in Table 4.1, b and h are
negatively related. Moreover, a positive relationship between b and d(¥) exists according to
the definition of d(¥) in Table 4.1. Steady-state government debt, therefore, is inversely





The first term on the LHS of the second inequality in (12) reflects the positive
externality on ’fiscal’ welfare if monetary authorities raise money growth to stabilize
government debt. The second term measures the positive spillover on ’monetary’ welfare if
the fiscal authorities decrease the primary fiscal deficit to stabilize government debt. The
cooperative equilibrium internalizes the positive spillover on the monetary policy-maker of
reductions in the primary fiscal deficit and the positive spillover on the fiscal policy-maker
from increases in the rate of money growth. Both actions reduce government debt accumu-
lation, thereby lowering the steady-state stock of debt and speeding up adjustment.
The information of Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 reveals that short-term fiscal policies are
typically too loose, while monetary policies are too tight in the non-cooperative equilibrium.






P is larger than h
O 13. However, (f(¥)-m(¥)) is larger under coop-
eration than under non cooperation, since b
P is smaller than b
O. Regarding steady-state
primary fiscal deficits and money creation in both equilibria, we can show the following:
12 Note that f+rd-m>0.
13 Note that d(0)>d.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 13
Proposition 4.2:
Steady-state primary fiscal deficits are lower in the cooperative Pareto equilibrium than in
the non-cooperative Nash open-loop, if:
Steady-state money creation is lower in the cooperative Pareto equilibrium than in the non-
(13a)
cooperative Nash open-loop, if:
Proof:
(13b)






O). With the definitions for
a
i and D
i from Table 4.2, this inequality can be rewritten as:
Dividing both the numerator and the denominator of the LHS by wl+k and at the RHS by
l, we arrive at:
which implies,







O). Substituting the expressions for
a
i and D
i from Table 4.2, we find:Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 14
which implies,
Multiplying both sides of this inequality by wk and collecting terms yields (13b).
If d=r, the policy conflict is resolved without intertemporal shifting and b equals 0.
In that case, coordinated policies, compared to uncoordinated policies, are more disciplined
in the long run (i.e. inflation and primary fiscal deficits are lower with cooperation), if a
P>a
O.
This is the case if the bargaining weight w of the fiscal player is small. Intuitively, the
coordinated equilibrium is dominated by the player caring more about low inflation and less
about high fiscal deficits.
If the Central Bank is dependent (i.e. k large), policies are likely to be more disci-
plined in the cooperative case. Intuitively, in that case, the externality of the fiscal authorities
on the monetary authorities (i.e. the ’fiscal externality’) dominates the externality of the
monetary authorities on the fiscal authorities (i.e. the ’monetary’ externality). With the fiscal
externality dominating the monetary externality, it is the fiscal rather than the monetary autho-
rity that has to conduct most of the adjustment in the coordinated equilibrium. If the Central
Bank is rather independent (small k), policies are more disciplined in the absence of
cooperation. The reason is that without cooperation the Central Bank is free to chose its own
restrictive monetary policy without paying much attention to the consequences on public debt
accumulation. Accordingly, coordination worsens discipline in this case. In other words, in
preserving discipline, independence acts as a substitute for coordination.
If policymakers are impatient (i.e. d exceeds r), the condition for tighter fiscal policy
in the coordinated case than in the uncoordinated case becomes stronger than a
P>a
O. The con-
dition for tighter monetary policies in the Pareto case, in contrast, weakens. The reason is that
coordinated policies result in less accumulation of public debt. The associated lower long-run
adjustment burden allows larger steady-state deficits and lower steady-state money growth.
If the weight of the fiscal authorities is the same under Pareto and Nash open-loop (i.e.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 15
a
P=a
O), coordination implies smaller primary fiscal deficits in the short run and larger
primary fiscal deficits in the long run. Intuitively, coordination implies that the adjustment
burden is shifted less to the future as the authorities value policies reducing debt accumula-
tion. Accordingly, monetary growth is higher in the short run but lower in the long run.
5. Comparative dynamics.
In the preceding section we explored the features of the initial state, adjustment speed
and steady-state of the Pareto and Nash open-loop equilibria. Here we examine how both
equilibria are affected by changes in both the preference parameters and the initial stock of
government debt. The partial derivatives are collected in Appendix C. Table 5.1 provides the
effects of parameter changes on the initial state {m(0),f(0)} and the adjustment speed, h:













d (0) + - o + - o
An increase of k raises money creation by the monetary authorities in the initial state
of both equilibria and speeds up the adjustment. An increase of l has similar effects as it
reduces the initial primary fiscal deficit and increases the adjustment speed. In the Nash open-
loop equilibrium the effect of an increase of k on the initial fiscal deficit and of an increase
in l on the initial money creation, are ambiguous of sign. With coordination, an increase in
k decreases f
P(0) and an increase in l increases m
P(0). In the cooperative equilibrium a higher
priority to debt stabilization attached by one player also induces the other player to act more
active regarding debt stabilization. In the non-cooperative case the opposite reaction is likely
to appear: more efforts of one player to reduce government debt induce the other player toMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 16
reduce its own effort. In both equilibria, a higher primary fiscal deficit target raises the initial
primary fiscal deficit, and a lower inflation target reduces initial inflation. A higher debt target
lowers initial inflation and raises the initial primary fiscal deficit, whereas a high initial stock
of government debt has the opposite effect.
The effects of changes in the preference parameters on the steady-state, {m(¥),f(¥),-
d(¥)} of both equilibria are found in Table 5.2:








l - (o) - (o) + (o) - (o) - ?(-)
k - (o) - (o) + (o) - (o) ?(+) +
m - (o) ? (+) + - (o) ?(+) +
f + (o) + ? (+) + (o) + ?(+)
d ++ - + + -
d (0) o o o o o
An increase in k and l lowers steady-state debt in both equilibria. In the Pareto case,
increases in k and l allow for lower steady-state inflation and higher steady-state primary fis-
cal deficits, because of the lower stock of steady-state debt that needs to be financed. In the
Nash open-loop, however, the effect of an increase of k on steady-state inflation and the
effect of an increase in l on steady-state money creation are ambiguous. An explanation for
this ambiguity is provided in Proposition 5.2.
Furthermore, a higher primary fiscal deficit target,f ,or a lower monetary target, m,
increase steady-state government debt. The impact of a change in the inflation target on
steady-state inflation is ambiguous as is the effect of a higher primary fiscal deficit target on
steady-state primary fiscal deficits. We explore this ambiguity in more detail in proposition
5.1. A higher debt target induces, in both equilibria, a higher steady-state level of government
debt and hence requires higher money growth and lower primary fiscal deficits in the long
run.
If different from the case of d>r, we have indicated the signs of the partial derivatives
if d=r between parentheses in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. If d=r, the conflict between monetary andMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 17
fiscal authorities is resolved without accumulation of government debt. In that case, steady-
state debt is not affected by changes in the preference parameters, since b is equal to 0. If
d=r, ambiguities of steady-state effects on the primary fiscal deficit and inflation disappear.
In particular, in the open-loop equilibrium, an increase in k increases steady-state inflation.
Furthermore, an increase in l decreases steady-state primary fiscal deficits. Note that these
effects contrast with to the cooperative equilibrium where such changes imply the opposite.
Moreover, an increase in the primary fiscal deficit target and the inflation target increase viz.
steady-state primary fiscal deficits and steady-state inflation in the Nash open-loop
equilibrium.
The intertemporal shifting of the adjustment burden of government debt stabilization
can give rise to unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of the type introduced by Sargent and
Wallace (1981). Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic occurs when disinflationary monetary
policies have to be reversed because of higher debt accumulation that such policies induce.
If fiscal authorities do not cut primary fiscal deficits to reduce government debt accumulation,
i.e. if the fiscal player is strong, a large part of the debt adjustment burden will be shifted
eventually to the monetary authority, resulting in higher inflation in the long run. Conversely,
fiscal expansions, e.g. in the form of tax cuts, have to be reversed in the long run if the fiscal
player is weak compared to the monetary player. The adjustment burden from larger
government debt that such policies produce is for the most part shifted back to the fiscal
authorities in the long run, if the Central Bank does not monetize the additional debt. We can
formulate the following proposition:Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 18
Proposition 5.1
A lower target value for inflation reduces inflation in the short run. However, it raises long-
run inflation if (a) l<r(d-r)-k/w with policy coordination and (b) l<r(d-r) without policy
coordination. A higher target value for primary fiscal deficits raises short-run deficits.
However, it reduces long-run primary fiscal deficits if (c) k<r(d-r)(wh+1)-wl with policy
coordination and (d) k<r(d-r) without policy coordination.
Proof:
The partial derivatives of m(¥) and f(¥) w.r.t. m and f are given in Appendix C. A decrease







O) are both positive. The partial derivatives of
m
P(¥) and m
O(¥) w.r.t. m imply that a decrease in m induces an increase in m(¥) if (a) 1-(1-
a
P)(1+rb
P)<0 in the Pareto equilibrium, and (b) 1-(1-a
O)(1+rb
O)<0 in the Nash open-loop
equilibrium. With the definitions of a and b in Table 4.1 and 4.2, we can rewrite (a)
as and (b) as . Rewriting both
inequalities and using the definitions ofD
P and D
O from Table 4.2, we find for (a) -
whereas (b) can be rewritten as Conditions (a) and (b) of the proposition then
follow. In a similar vein, we find that an increase in f induces an instantaneous increase in






O) are positive. According to the
partial derivatives of f
P(¥) and f
O(¥) w.r.t. f, an increase in f causes a permanent decrease
in f(¥) if (c) in the Pareto equilibrium and
(d) in the Nash open-loop equilibrium. (c) and (d) can be rewrittenMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 19
as and respectively, from which conditions (c) and (d) of
the proposition follow directly.
Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic implies that the initial disinflation is not sustainable
in the long run and that the new steady-state is instead characterized by a higher rate of
inflation. This becomes more likely if the fiscal authorities are strong, i.e. l is small,
impatience is high, i.e. d r, and if the bargaining power of the fiscal authorities is high in
the case of cooperation, i.e. if w is large. Unpleasant fiscal arithmetic, on the other hand,
occurs if monetary authorities are strong, i.e. k is small, impatience is high, and if the
bargaining power of the fiscal authorities is low or their inflation aversion is high under
cooperation, i.e. if w is large and h is high.
Unpleasant monetary and fiscal arithmetic can occur only if the discount rate substan-
tially exceeds the interest rate. Indeed, a larger fiscal blisspoint raises the long-run primary
fiscal deficit, if authorities are patient (i.e. d=r). If authorities are impatient, in contrast, the
long-run deficit may decline if the weight attached to debt stabilization in the objective
function of monetary authorities is small. Intuitively, the burden of adjustment associated with
larger short-run primary deficits is not met through monetization. Instead, it is shifted to the
future through debt accumulation. With the monetary authority being strong, the burden is
eventually paid by the fiscal authorities in terms of lower primary deficits. Indeed, the expres-
sion for the long-run primary deficit in Table 4.1 reveals that unpleasant fiscal arithmetic
occurs only if both b and a are large (i.e. a(1+rb)>1): a high value of b indicates substantial
intertemporal shifting, while a high a reflects a strong position of the monetary authorities.
If we assume that monetary authorities care more about inflation than fiscal authorities, i.e.
that l/h>k, unpleasant fiscal arithmetic is less likely to occur with coordination: the faster
adjustment implies less debt accumulation as compared to the Nash open-loop equilibrium
(see proposition 4.1).
Fiscal consolidation possesses a political-economy dimension because expenditure
cuts and increases in ordinary taxes and the inflation tax typically affect groups of constitu-
ents in a different manner. Left-wing governments are generally believed to prefer more activeMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 20
fiscal and monetary policies than do right-wing governments. The replacement of a right-wing
government by a left-wing government could be represented by a simultaneous increase in
f and m and perhaps even an increase in the debt target, d. The effects on steady-state fiscal
deficits, inflation and government debt according to Table 4.1 will depend in particular on the
change of (f+rd-m) that results from such a change in orientation of the policymakers.
The parameter k, which models the weight monetary authorities attach to debt stabi-
lization, is inversely related to the independence of the Central Bank. The issue of central
bank independence has encountered a lot of interest, both in politics and academics.
Cukierman (1992) summarizes the current insights into this issue. Central in the literature on
central bank independence stands the interaction with the private sector, an aspect that does
not feature in our analysis. Public finance aspects and strategic interaction with a fiscal player
are, however, neglected in the literature on central bank independence. Only recently, Jensen
(1994) introduced seignorage revenues into the Barro-Gordon type of models that dominate
the literature on central bank independence.
The degree of central bank independence has important effects in our model. In
particular, more Central Bank independence implies that the fiscal authorities face a larger
adjustment burden from debt stabilization than they did before. This yields the following
proposition:
Proposition 5.2
More independence of the monetary authorities, (a) reduces the adjustment speed and in-
creases steady-state debt. (b) Under policy coordination, more Central Bank independence
decreases steady-state primary fiscal deficits and increases steady-state inflation if policyma-
kers are impatient, (i.e. if d>r). (c) In the open-loop case, in contrast, a more independent
Central Bank reduces both steady-state primary fiscal deficits and inflation if l>r(d-r), i.e.
if fiscal authorities are not too strong.
Proof :
According to the definitions in Table 4.1 and 4.2, a decrease in k implies that the adjustment
speed of the cooperative equilibrium and the Nash open-loop equili-brium, h
P and h
O,Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 21
decrease. Since steady-state debt is negatively related to the adjustment speed (cf. Table 4.1),
a decrease of k increases steady-state debt (given our assumptions that (f+rd-m)>0 and d>r).
This proves (a). In the Pareto equilibrium, k does not affect a
P according to Table 4.2. Hence,
changes in k affect f
P(¥) and m
P(¥) only by changing b
P.I fd = r ,b
Pequals 0 and changes
of k have no effect at all. If d>r, a decrease in k reduces the adjustment speed implying an
increase in b
P. A higher b
P implies higher steady-state government debt and, consequently,
lower steady-state primary fiscal deficits and higher steady-state inflation, as stated in (b). In
the Nash open-loop equilibrium, a decrease in k increases both a
O and b
O. According to the
definition in Table 4.1, the long run primary fiscal deficit, f
O(¥) decreases. Long run inflation,
m
O(¥), decreases if k is lowered, as long as the decrease in (1-a
O) exceeds the increase in
(1+rb
O). A decrease of k, decreases (1-a
O) by and to an increase in (1+rb
O)
of The first effect dominates the second effect if This leads
to part (c) of the proposition.
Without coordination, a more independent Central Bank may be counterproductive in
reducing long-run inflation if authorities are impatient and at the same time the fiscal
authorities are strong (in the sense that they attach a low priority to stabilizing debt).
14
Hence, making a central bank more independent is not enough to ensure low inflation rates.
Low inflation rates are sustainable only if fiscal authorities are disciplined (i.e. they attach
substantial weight to debt stabilization) and patient (i.e. d does not exceed r by a large
margin). This suggests that an independent CB needs to be complemented by fiscal reforms
to ensure low inflation rates. Whereas a more independent Central Bank may raise inflation
in the long run, it succeeds in strengthening fiscal discipline by reducing fiscal deficits in the
14 Note that the condition for a more independent central bank to raise long-run
inflation is the same condition for a lower target value for money growth to raise long-
run inflation, in the open-loop case.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 22
long run.
15 With coordination, a more independent Central Bank raises the intertemporal
shifting of the adjustment burden to the future. This allows larger fiscal deficits and lower
money growth in the short run, but requires lower deficits and higher money growth in the
long run.
6. Numerical simulations with the model.
The analytical results from the preceding section can be illustrated with a stylized






The initial situation is characterized by a high stock of government debt and policymakers
featuring a high rate of time preference. However, a fairly high primary deficit target is com-
bined with a conservative inflation target. A value of k of 0.02, implies that the Central Bank
is not entirely independent. Cooperative policies give a relatively large weight to fiscal objec-
tives. A debt target of 60% of GDP is chosen for this economy, the entrance criterium for the
European Monetary Union. Doubts are often raised whether the EC will satisfy the fiscal con-
vergence criteria in 1999, when the introduction of the common currency is planned
16. With
this set of model parameters the Pareto and open-loop Nash equilibria display the following
character:
15 Only with positive public assets in the initial equilibrium (i.e. d(0) negative) may
fiscal policy become more expansionary in the short run.
16 A steady-state debt ratio of 60% of GDP results from primary fiscal deficits of 3%
of GDP and a net of output growth real interest rate of 5%, as the Delors Committee
assumed when advocating such debt and deficit targets. As the simulations will show,
however, it can take a fairly long time before new steady- states are achieved. The quick
convergence implicitly assumed by the Delors Committee implicitly seems to be rather on
the optimistic side. Cosetti and Roubini (1993) test the sustainability of current govern-
ment debt accumulation in the EC. They find that the current process of government debt
accumulation in Italy, Belgium and Ireland is not sustainable in the long run.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 23













F (t0) 0.264 0.283
L
CB(t0) 0.156 0.171
The adjustment paths of government, money creation, primary and total fiscal deficit are
displayed in graphs (6.1a)-(6.1d):
Figure 6.1a Government debt dynamicsMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 24
Figure 6.1b Primary fiscal deficit dynamics
Figure 6.1c Fiscal deficit dynamicsMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 25
Figure 6.1d Inflation dynamics
{l,k,w,h} have been chosen in such a manner that the intratemporal shares of the adjustment
burden from government debt stabilization are the same in both equilibria, a
P=a
O. The dif-
ferences between both equilibria are caused, therefore, by differences in the intertemporal
allocation of the adjustment burden, as measured by b
i. In the cooperative equilibrium less
of the adjustment is postponed to the future (b
P is smaller than b
O): inflation is higher in the
short run than it is under non-cooperative policies, whereas fiscal deficits are smaller in the
short run. Coordination of policies is more effective in bringing about a reduction in steady-
state government debt, as we proved in proposition 4.1. According to the calculated losses,
both players benefit from coordination of monetary and fiscal policy.
Consider the possibility of making the Central Bank more independent. If we decrease
k from 0.02 to 0, the following picture emerges:Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 26













F (t0) 0.283 0.375
L
CB(t0) 0.021 0.000
Higher Central Bank independence slows down the adjustment speed considerably and
leads to a higher steady-state level of government debt, as we indicated in part (a) of
proposition 5.2. Especially in the non-cooperative case, the decrease in steady-state
government debt is limited. Also the effects mentioned in part (b) and (c) of proposition 5.2
show up, although the effects on steady-state deficits and inflation are very small under
coordination. Fiscal authorities face a much higher adjustment burden than they did before
especially in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In the Nash open-loop case the share of the
fiscal authorities in the adjustment burden increases from 0.6 to 1 with an independent Central
Bank.
A decrease in the rate of output growth, hampers debt stabilization because lower
economic growth increases the interest burden of outstanding debt. The adjustment burden
from government debt stabilization, therefore, is higher if the initial stock of government debt
is high. A drop of g by 2% increases r from 2 to 4% and brings about the following situation:Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 27













F (t0) 0.280 0.297
L
CB (t0) 0.161 0.175
Government debt stabilization is achieved at the cost of a permanent decrease in
primary fiscal deficits and an increase in inflation. As compared to the initial situation in
Table 6.1, less of the adjustment burden is shifted to the future, since b is lower, both in the
cooperative and non-cooperative case.
Conclusions
This paper extended the analysis of Tabellini (1986) concerning the conflict between
monetary and fiscal authorities on debt stabilization. The differential game framework on the
interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities was reconsidered. We derived explicit
solutions of the dynamics of the fiscal deficit, inflation and government debt in the
cooperative and Nash open-loop equilibria. A comparison between both equilibria provided
interesting results regarding differences in transitional dynamics and steady-state characteris-
tics of both equilibria. Coordination of fiscal and monetary policies internalizes the positive
spillover from debt stabilization efforts and thus induces a higher adjustment speed and lower
steady-state debt. Cooperation in policies, however, can lead to higher steady-state inflationMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 28
if the Central Bank is weak.
The unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace was reformulated in the
context of the differential game between the Treasury and Central Bank. A strong fiscal
player -in the sense of not taking any responsibility in debt stabilization- was seen to be the
cause of the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. Moreover, we considered the effects of
measures to strengthen the independence of the Central Bank in both equilibria. In the
cooperative equilibrium a more independent Central Bank causes higher long run inflation,
basically because of the higher government debt accumulation that such a measure induces.
In the Nash open-loop equilibrium, more Central Bank independence reduces long run
inflation, if the fiscal player is not too strong at least. Finally, we used a numerical example
to illustrate our main findings.
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Appendix A The dynamic government budget constraint.
The nominal primary fiscal deficit, F(t), and nominal interest payments on government
debt, i(t)D(t), can be financed either by government debt accumulation, D ˙, or base money
creation B ˙:
Assume that the nominal interest rate, i(t), behaves according to the Fisher hypothesis:
(A.1)
in which r(t) denotes the real interest rate and p
e the expected rate of inflation. In real terms
(A.2)
and expressed in fractions of real GDP, the dynamic government budget constraint can be
written as follows:
where lower-case variables denote real variables as fractions of GDP. It has been assumed for
(A.3)
simplicity that the real interest rate, the growth rate of real output, g, and inflation
expectations are exogenously given and constant. (A.3) reappears in the main text as (1),
where (r-g) is replaced by r and (b ˙+(p-p
e)d(t)) by m(t).
If we assume for simplicity that demand for base money, B(t), is of the constant
velocity type: B(t)=k.P(t)y(t), velocity will not be not influenced by the rate of inflation. Real
money creation as a fraction of GDP, b ˙, is equal to (p+g)b(t)=(p+g)k. pk is the inflation tax
on real base money in circulation whereas gk reflects structural growth in real base money
from higher demand for transaction purposes because of economic growth. Seignorage
revenues m(t) arise from increases in the amount of real base money in circulation, b ˙, and the
inflation tax on holders of nominal government debt, (p-p
e)d(t). m(t) is a positive linear
function of inflation, given the growth rate of real output, g, velocity of money, k, inflation
expectations, p
e, and the outstanding stock of government debt at time t, d(t):Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 30
Appendix B. Analytical solutions of the Pareto and Nash open-loop equilibria.
The {d(t),µ
i(t)} systems that result from the interaction between monetary and fiscal
authorities in the Pareto and Nash open-loop case are linear dynamic systems of the form,
The steady-state of the system, x(¥), is found by solving:
(B.1)
The adjustment speed, h, of the dynamic systems is defined as the absolute value of the stable
(B.2)
eigenvalue of A. The eigenvalues are the roots from the characteristic polynomial that is found
by solving det(A-wI)=0 where w is the vector of eigenvalues. If the dynamic systems are
saddlepoint stable, the co-state variables µ
i(t) will take initial values µ
i(0) such that the system
is placed on its unique converging dynamic trajectory, given the initial stock of debt d(0). The
initial value of the forward-looking variables, µ
i(0), is found by applying the method proposed
by Judd (1982):
- take the Laplace
17 transform L[(.),s] of the dynamic system, x ˙=Ax+b:
- use the fact that L[x ˙,s]= s.L[x,s]-x(0). Equating both expressions for L[x ˙,s] yields:
(B.3)
- impose the condition that µ
i(0) adjusts in such a manner that saddlepoint stability of the
(B.4)
dynamic system is ensured, given the initial stock of government debt, d(0). This implies that
L[b,z]+x(0)=0, where z is any unstable eigenvalue of A. Imposing this condition gives µ
i(0).
I The Pareto equilibrium
The cooperative equilibrium is characterized by the following {d(t),µ
i(t)} system:
17 The Laplace transform of f(t), F(s) is defined as: .Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 31
The inverse of the matrix A of (B.5) is equal to:
(B.5)
The stable eigenvalue of A determines the adjustment speed, h
P, of the average system (B.5):
(B.6)
where the determinant of A, D
P , is equal to the product of the adjustment speed, h
P, and the
(B.7)




P is equal to h




P. If we define b
P as , we can write the steady-state of the system as:




If we define and and note furthermore that
(B.10)
, we can rewrite (B.10) as:Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 32
Subtracting f
P(¥) and m
P(¥), we arrive at:
(B.11)
To determine the initial state of the Pareto equilibrium, take the Laplace transform of (B.5),
(B.12)
A solution to (B.13) remains bounded if µ
P(0) satisfies:
(B.13)
The unstable eigenvalue z
P of the adjustment matrix A is equal to h
P+d. Therefore, we can
(B.14)
rewrite (B.14) as,




Using the definitions of a
P,b
P and D






II The Nash open-loop equilibrium
The dynamic system of the Nash open-loop equilibrium is given by:
The three eigenvalues of A in (B.19) are -h
O,z
O =h
O+d and d-r. The adjustment speed of
(B.19)
(B.19) is equal to:
The inverse of A is equal to
(B.20)
If we define b




Using the first order conditions in (6) and (7), we can write f
O(¥) and m
O(¥) as:
Defining and , we can rewrite (B.23) as:





Find the initial state of the Nash open-loop equilibrium by taking the Laplace transform of
(B.25)
(B.19):





F( t ) and µ
CB(t) take such initial values that both of the following conditions
hold,
hold. Combining both conditions, we arrive at:
(B.27)
Substituting (B.28) into the first order conditions (6) and (7), gives:
(B.28)
With the definitions of a
O and b
O, and noting that and
(B.29)Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 35
18 (B.29) can be rewritten as:





Appendix C Comparative dynamics of the Pareto and Nash open-loop equilibria.
If we calculate the partial derivatives of initial values, steady-states and the adjustment speed
w.r.t. the model parameters, we can infer the effects of changes in the model parameters. If
we assume that d>r
19, f+rd>m and d(0)>d we can sign the partial derivatives in the Pareto
and Nash open-loop equilibria as follows:
18 These follow since: and
.
19 The signs of the various partial derivatives in the case where d=r are found by
noting that d=r implies that b
P and b
O are equal to zero.Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 36
- of the initial money creation, m(0):
- of the initial fiscal deficit, f(0):Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 37
- of the adjustment speed, h:
- of steady-state government debt:Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction and Government Debt Stabilization 38
- of steady-state money creation:
- of steady-state fiscal deficit: